What it’s for
Public allocations that went wrong, grouped by what went wrong, with the source next to each one. And how a verifiable number is used so it does not happen again.
First, and with no small print
what this proves : that the number was not chosen, and when it came out
what this does NOT : who was on the list
prove who held the ticket
that you get paid what you won
Everything below holds within that limit. Nothing here accuses anyone: each case is a fact reported by the press, audited by an oversight body or settled by a court, and the link to the source is in the same row.
The pattern, in one line
In six of the cases below there was a notary, appointed supervisors, witnesses in the room or a live broadcast.
In five of those six, the control failed or was irrelevant.
| Where | The control in place | What happened anyway |
|---|---|---|
| Turkey | Notary certifying, live broadcast | 72,659 people were left out before the notary ever looked |
| Vietnam | Five staff, two supervisors, live radio | Nobody saw the balls being swapped, for two years |
| Las Flores, AR | Government notary, live, 60 people in the room | A ball was missing; a neighbour found it reviewing the video afterwards |
| Ireland | Blindfolded children, uniformed nurses | That was the staging, not the proof |
| Dominican Republic | Public event, broadcast live on television | It prevented nothing |
| Champions League | Club officials present in the room | It worked — and it is the only one |
The one that worked did so because the error was visible at a glance to people who knew the rules by heart and were watching that exact second. That is not a method: it is luck. And in a housing allocation there is nobody like that in the room.
Where it hurts, and none of this is a game
| Allocation | The pain that already exists |
|---|---|
| Social housing | Las Flores, Coslada, Alicante, Logroño, Corumbá. Every municipality, every year |
| Citizens' assemblies | The European Commission, the Netherlands, Ireland and Chile already use them. Today the method is a bingo cage |
| School admission | New York: «truly random», and they would not hand them over |
| Jury selection | Hartford, Illinois, Colombia. Structural |
| Conscription and compulsory call-ups | United States, 1969: the order was not uniform, and it was proven with statistics |
| Audit or inspection sampling | Customs red/green channel, anti-doping control, tax audits |
| Licences, quotas and case assignment | Ecuador, Canada, the United States, South Korea |
In all of them the sentence that settles the problem is the same: «I did not choose it, and you can check.»
How it is used, in four steps
The body does not ask us for permission, does not hire us and sends us no data at all. We publish the number; the allocation is done and published by the body itself.
1. the body publishes its list of applicants BEFORE the turn <- its own commitment 2. it takes the value of the announced turn 3. it uses that as the seed of a shuffle IT publishes 4. anyone reproduces the order from the list + our number
Step 1 is theirs and it is essential: the list of applicants belongs to the body, not to us. Without that prior commitment an honest number does not fix a rigged universe — which is exactly what failed in the first group below.
The cases, grouped by what failed
Grouped on purpose: one by one they look like isolated misfortunes; grouped, you can see they are six failures that repeat across every country and every decade.
1 · The universe was wrong before anything started
The event itself was flawless. The list it ran on was not.
| Case | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Las Flores, AR, 2026 | Ball 0 was missing from the hundreds cage: ~139 families could not possibly be picked |
InfoZona |
| Turkey, 2026 | The software did not recognise seven-digit numbers: 72,659 applicants never entered | Cumhuriyet |
| Netherlands, 2000-2008 | Prizes were allocated over a pool that included unsold tickets. The Hoge Raad ruled it misleading | Cassatieblog |
| Ecuador, 2019-2022 | By re-filing the case under another category, the pool of possible judges went from 215 to 4. Ten officials dismissed | Observatorio Anticorrupción |
| Colombia | 862,392 polling-station jurors selected by software, with no public way to reproduce it | Registraduría |
| Corumbá, BR, 2026 | Repeated names reported on the list for the allocation of 181 homes | Midiamax |
| South Korea, 2024-26 | 🔴 False addresses and false dependants to qualify for the better quotas. Eleven referred to prosecutors | Newsis |
| United States, H-1B, 2023-24 | 🔴 408,891 registrations from people entered by multiple colluding sponsors. The rule was changed | Mayer Brown |
What would have changed: the universe is declared inside the signed file and is the same for everyone, so it cannot be widened or trimmed afterwards. The two rows marked 🔴 are not covered: there what was tampered with is the roll of applicants, and that has to be published and committed by the body before the turn.
2 · The machine or the program was rigged
| Case | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| United States, five states | The information security director of the multi-state association —the man whose job was to stop exactly that— walked a USB stick into one of the two machines that produced the numbers and installed a rootkit he had written himself. It did not pick the number: it shrank the pool of numbers that could come out. And the code deleted itself after a while. Five states; the largest payout was US$16.5 million. Ten years in prison | Wikipedia |
| Vietnam, 2000-2002 | Counterfeit balls swapped in during the event. 36 defendants; the former head got 21 years | VnExpress |
| Dominican Republic, 2021 | The event was altered and protocol broken; a channel aired a doctored video. Sentences of 7 and 6 years | Attorney General · Diario Libre |
| Mexico | The fraud was run by the institution's own staff, twice | San Diego Red |
| Germany, 2007-09 | The channel's editors decided who got on air. Fine of €105,000 | DWDL |
| United Kingdom, 2007 | Finalists were picked before the lines closed. Fines of £2M and £5.6M | Wikipedia |
What would have changed: the value is not produced by the operator. It is derived from a seed published as a commitment before the turn and revealed afterwards, plus a round from an external public network. There is no physical object to swap, no in-house generator to touch, and nobody who gets to choose.
The five-state case deserves a paragraph of its own
That code was not found by any audit. Not by a laboratory, not by a certification, not by an internal review. They caught him because a lawyer refused to say who had bought the ticket, and because a shop's security camera showed the buyer was him.
The certification was already in place. It said the program was correct — and a certificate does not say which program ran that night.
That is why this site does not ask you to take a laboratory's word for it. It publishes the seed committed beforehand, the inputs and the result, and anyone can run the computation: change one input and a different number comes out. Code that shrinks the pool does not survive that, whatever certificate it holds, because the result has to reproduce from a seed published in advance — and it does not.
3 · The honest mistake — and it is the most common
None of these is fraud. All of them did the same damage.
| Case | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| United States, Hartford (Connecticut) | The program read the trailing «d» of «Hartford» as a deceased marker. Three years without a single juror from two cities, which held 63% of the district's eligible Black population | US v. Jackman |
| United States, Illinois, 2026 | Of 200 jurors drawn, 61 were dead. It had been wrong since 1993 and may affect ~80 of 102 counties | KWQC |
| United States, DV-2012 visas | A computer error voided the results: 22,000 selected applicants were left with nothing | CI Law Group |
| United States, conscription, 1969 | Mixing the capsules physically was not enough: men born late in the year drew low numbers with a regularity that can be shown with statistics | Wikipedia · the data |
| Netherlands, ~2019 | Eleven pupils misplaced by a fault in the school matching process | Onderwijsgids |
| United States (DC), 2023 | The contractor published test numbers on the official site. They stayed online for three days | NPR |
This is the whole argument of this site: it takes no bad faith for an allocation to go wrong, and it takes no accusation to fix it. It takes a result that can be recomputed from the outside. Five of these six would have shown on day one, and 1969 is the best example of all: it was caught precisely because the data was public and somebody could do the arithmetic.
4 · The result existed, and nobody outside could check it
| Case | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| New York | The Department of Education said the numbers were «truly random» and refused to hand them over: they were long strings «families would not understand». Families had to reconstruct it themselves | Algorithms in the Wild |
| Coslada, ES | An opaque urn, lined with paper and unsealed, with the notary acting as the innocent hand. Neither the complainant can prove it nor the notary disprove it | El Cierre Digital |
| Bolívar, AR | Public accusation of manipulation in the allocation of 168 plots. Irrefutable in both directions | InfoCielo |
| Alicante, ES | No transparency in the allocation of publicly protected housing: the event was not published and there was no way to review it afterwards | Miguel Ángel Blanes |
| Logroño, ES, 2026 | The opposition feared the reserved quotas —disability, victims of gender violence— were not being honoured, with no prior public control able to show either way | nuevecuatrouno |
| Spain, civil-service exams | 33 people with inflated scores. Prosecutors shelved it; a judge reopened it on the candidates' own complaint | The Objective |
| Bulgaria | The same six numbers in two consecutive events. Official investigation | Novinite |
| South Africa | 5-6-7-8-9 came out and 20 people matched. The investigation found no fraud |
ABC News |
| Philippines | 433 matching entries with the same combination. The Senate opened a hearing | Inquirer · GMA |
| Russia | The official defence was «it was live on television and 8.5 million people watched»: witnesses offered instead of proof | Meduza |
This group is the one that best explains why this exists. In Bulgaria, South Africa and the Philippines there probably was no cheating — the investigations found nothing. It makes no difference: with no way to check from the outside, the operator's honesty and the suspicion are worth exactly the same, and the suspicion never dies.
5 · The failure was outside the allocation
Listed because they are real and because they mark the limit: this does not solve them.
| Case | What failed | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Canada, Ontario | The people selling the tickets were claiming the prizes: ~US$100 million over seven years. 78 owners and 131 employees | Ombudsman of Ontario |
| China, 2004 | The winner's ticket was declared a fake. Eleven convicted, up to 19 years | Wikipedia |
| India | The retailer said he had never sold the ticket to the winner. The CBI investigated | Deccan Herald |
| Canada, licences, 2019 | 18 of 42 selected applicants disqualified in the second round, 12 for missing the documentation deadline | CBC |
| Costa Rica, 2026 | Prizes paid on fractions reported as unsold and destroyed. Audited by the Comptroller General | Amelia Rueda |
| Ireland, 1930-87 | Tickets that never made it into the drum. An estimated ~10% of what was raised reached the hospitals. The journalist who exposed it lost his job and emigrated | RTÉ |
6 · They gave up on chance because they could not make it credible
| Case | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Chile, school admission | Chance is being replaced by a non-random function. They did not change it because it was wrong: they changed it because they could not make it credible | T13 |
| United States, FCC spectrum, 1982-93 | The mechanism rewarded filing many applications. In 1993 Congress replaced it with auctions. It was abandoned, not fixed | FCC report |
This is the ending this site is trying to avoid: that chance gets discarded because it cannot be demonstrated, and is replaced by something a person decides.
The exception, and it has to be read as one
In December 2021, in the Champions League round-of-16 draw, a ball went into the wrong pot and another was not put back. Club officials present in the room caught it on the spot, and the whole thing was redone three hours later. (ESPN)
It worked because the error was visible at a glance to people who knew the rules by heart and were watching that second. In a housing allocation there is nobody like that in the room, and in the other five cases with human oversight the oversight was no help.
What this does not solve, once more
Repeated on purpose, because it is what separates this from a promise:
what this proves : that the number was not chosen, and when it came out
what this does NOT : who was on the list
prove who held the ticket
that you get paid what you won
All of group 5 and the two rows marked 🔴 are here for that reason. The roll of applicants is published and committed by the body; the ticket and the payment are theirs. We publish a number with its proof. That is all.
What was left out, and why
More cases were researched than are listed above. These did not make it in:
| Case | Why it is not here |
|---|---|
| Bolivia, court case assignment | A single source and no known ruling |
| Peru, plots in Tacna | No resolution |
| United States, NBA draft order, 1985 | Nothing proven. It is a suspicion that is still alive, not a fact |
| France, climate assembly | A methodological criticism, not a failure |
| Italy, frozen balls | The only source that supported it is no longer online |
| Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Kenya, Thailand | Searched, and no established case turned up |
A poorly supported case does not weaken only itself: it weakens the other forty. That is why the list above is shorter than the research behind it.